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omy, is given in some detail; and the great work of Archimedes and his place in the history of science are made clear to the reader. The part that the Romans played in the history of science does not seem to me adequately or clearly told.

The story of medieval and modern science is naturally better told. The authors seem to me to have selected admirably the facts that were important for the student to be shown; though there is much that is confusing and too little that is enlightening for the beginner who wishes to see the forest rather than the trees. Yet let me hasten to add that there are most enlightening paragraphs scattered here and there, and that the last chapter, on natural science in the nineteenth century, is especially illuminating.

In general, this is not the textbook on the history of science which I wish we might put into the hands of our undergraduates; but it is so much better than any we have had, that we are greatly indebted to the authors. In saying this I have especially in mind the teachers of philosophy who believe that the department of philosophy should hold itself responsible for the teaching of the history of science in our colleges.

WALTER T. MARVIN.

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Instinct in Man. A Contribution to the Psychology of Education. By JAMES DREVER. Cambridge, University Press, 1917.—pp. x, 281.

This essay, originally a thesis for the doctorate at the University of Edinburgh, is here published without material changes. It is a comprehensive and detailed psychological study of the instinctive tendencies in man. The author's general standpoint is similar to that of McDougall, though different in details. The subtitle is misleading; the references to education are few and perfunctory.

In the introductory chapter the author differentiates psychology from biology and physiology as the science whose explanations are "in terms of experience, in psychical terms" (p. 4). While thus not an extreme behaviorist, his attitude is functional, as is illustrated by his provisional definition of instinct as "an innate impelling force guiding cognition, accompanied by interest or emotion, and at least partly determining action" (p. 20).

Two chapters devoted to an historical sketch of the more important views of instinct in modern times disclose extensive knowledge of the sources of the history of psychology. The following three chapters criticize theories of instinct advanced by Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Stout, and Charles Myers. The seventh chapter opens with an effective criticism of Thorndike's elaborate attempts to classify instincts as definite responses to definite situations. Though taking sides with McDougall on this last point, the author takes issue with McDougall's doctrine that emotions are invariable accompaniments of instinctive activity. He concedes that all instinctive activity has an affective tone, an interest but he restricts the term 'emotion' to cases where the activity is impeded and the affective side intensified in consequence. The reviewer

doubts if the issue here with McDougall is much more than one of definition. The author gives a classification of "man's original instinctive tendencies" on "the same general lines as McDougall's, but more fully wrought out" (p. 169). In most instances the changes seem to the reviewer to be improvements. In the four concluding chapters, devoted respectively to the 'instinct tendencies,' 'interests and sentiments,' 'general instinct tendencies' and 'appetite tendencies,' various details are added by the author to the general conceptions that he has adapted from McDougall, Shand, Karl Groos, Baldwin and others. Three appendices treat of meaning as affective, Driesch's interpretation of instinct, and a minor point regarding the 'joy emotions' recognized by the author.

While this essay cannot be said to propose any fundamental changes in the main conceptions of social psychology, it merits commendation as a thorough piece of work, and most of the detailed modifications it suggests appear to be well reasoned out and convincing.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

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The Secret of Personality. The Problem of Human Life as Viewed in the Light of an Hypothesis of Man's Religious Faith. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Longmans, Green & Co.—pp. 287.

Professor Ladd dedicates this volume "to those who at present lament the appalling waste of personal values," in the belief that the time prompts to fresh inquiry into man's nature and destiny. His inquiry, outlined below, aims, not at scientific certainty, but at the statement of a hypothesis upon a level, as regards conceivability, with those of the natural and social sciences and philosophy.

Men are commonly thought to have more worth than things or animals because they are 'persons.' What is it to be a person? It means that in all man feels, does, thinks, he shows awareness of a 'self' and of other spirits with whom he feels akin. This 'self' has a body and soul, somehow united and interdependent; it is the same through the changes of life, yet different from other selves; it comes to be on the mental side through the unifying effect of association, and through the control of associations, the choice of dispositions and habits, by will. To attain its full growth it must learn to know things, self, and their values, and express these values in conduct; it must become a person, rational, moral, æsthetic and religious.

Man's knowledge depends upon his belief in and respect for reality. Science speaks only of phenomena, but the term means nothing if not the appearance of some real thing to some real person. *What* reality is, man learns sooner from self than from things. He finds himself capable of producing changes and compelled to suffer them, and such terms as 'Cause' and 'Force' he applies to things by transfer from experience of himself as will. The 'respect for reality' which guides the development of science is derived from the demands of intelligent will, or reason. 'Nature must obey laws,' *i. e.*, it must be rational.